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The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issue of Treaty reform and its consequences for 20 monetary policy. Inter alia, the changes include that the institutional set-up will be subtly 21 changed and the European Central Bank (ECB) will be grouped in the first part of the Treaty as 22 one of the "other institutions and advisory bodies". Possibly more importantly, the euro area as 23 such will be in the position to act legally as itself within the European Union (EU) legal 24 structures. The Eurogroup also will be officially recognized ("Euro-Ecofin-Council"). President 25 Jean-Claude Trichet's concern about the status of the ECB under the new Treaty and fear that by 26 including the bank in a list of EU institutions implies a risk that EU member states could 27 formulate policy recommendations to the ECB, but may also lead to more central bank 28 conservatism with the ECB as explained in our analysis. In this paper we analyze the trade-off 29 between central bank independence and conservatism with New Keynesian framework 30 following Woodford [Woodford, M., 2003 . Interest and prices: foundations of a theory of 31 monetary policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton.] and others. Our conclusion is that the 32 trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism still holds within the New 33 Keynesian framework. Politicians should therefore realize that their attempts to downgrade 34 ECB's independence legally and verbally will only increase its conservatism in order to maintain 35 the same inflationary bias and limit the ECB's degrees of freedom with respect to its interest 36 rate policy.
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Introduction

50
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issue of Treaty reform and its consequences for monetary policy. Inter alia, the 51 changes include that the institutional set-up will be subtly changed and the European Central Bank (ECB) will be grouped in the 52 first part of the Treaty as one of the "other institutions and advisory bodies". Possibly more importantly, the euro area as such will 53 be in the position to act legally as itself within the European Union (EU) legal structures. The Eurogroup also will be officially 54 recognized ("Euro-Ecofin-Council"). The rules for enhanced cooperation have also been further facilitated from the Treaty of Nice, 55 also applying for the area of economic governance (e.g. euro area coordination, tax policy, exchange rates).
56
In essence, the content of the new proposed reform treaty is very similar to that of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
57
Europe. It has just been modified and rephrased, as many heads of the different EU governments have already confirmed. In July The three-pillar structure will be abolished, as to simplify the structure of the EU. The structure will be reorganized, with more 66 emphasis on foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. More democracy is realized by giving national parliaments 67 and the European Parliament (EP) a bigger say, while the power of the European Commission (EC) will decrease. The EP will be on 68 equal footing with the Council of Ministers in many areas in terms of decision making. Also, a withdrawal option will be included,
69
as to state that member states are part of the EU by their own choosing. The change in the institutional set-up of the ECB will be 70 most important for the working of monetary policy and the status of the ECB. The latter effects will be singled out later in the text 71 and treated in more detail. Furthermore, decision making will be made more swiftly and more commonly supported by the system 72 of qualified majority voting, which will be introduced in more than forty new areas. This is also going to apply to economic 73 governance. These measures include the giving up of veto power in many areas (including the ECB's powers over financial 74 regulation), the appointment of a permanent President of the European Council, and a reinforcement of the Commission's 75 authority. Also, as will be clear later on, it is easier to amend the treaty in the new form, by means of co-decision and qualified 76 majority voting, so that a new IGC will not be necessary. with the ECB as will be explained by our analysis.
95
Section 2 discusses briefly the time inconsistency problem and the rationale for central bank independence based on Rogoff
96
(1985) and others. In Section 3 we analyze whether there exists a trade-off between independence and conservatism within a New
97
Keynesian framework following Woodford (2003) and others. Section 4 draws some conclusions. in this field stresses the time inconsistency problem (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983) . The basic idea behind 108 the time-inconsistency problem can be explained as follows. Suppose, the policy maker announces a certain inflation rate that (s) 109 he considers optimal. If private sector agents take this announced inflation rate into account in their behavior, it becomes at that 110 time optimal for the government to renege and to create a higher than announced inflation rate. (2003):
148 where x t is the period t output gap, E t x t + 1 the current period expectation of next period's output gap, σ is the interest elasticity of 149 the output gap, i t the current period nominal interest rate, E t π t + 1 the current period expectation of next period's inflation rate, r t n 150 the neutral real interest rate in period t, β the discount factor, κ the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap and u t a supply shock 151 (cost push shock). The monetary policy maker fully controls the short-term nominal interest rate i t . The micro-foundations of the model imply that σ, κ N 0 and 0 b β b 1. For society as a whole, the welfare theoretic loss function is of the form:
where β is again the discount factor and the per period loss function is given by:
157 where x ⁎ is a certain optimal level for the output gap and λ is the weight attached to output gap stabilization relative to inflation 158 stabilization. Woodford (2003) justifies the convenient and widely assumed specification of the quadratic loss function (4) by 159 showing that it represents a second-order Taylor series approximation of the representative household's expected utility. Woodford (2003) also derives an optimal weight on output stabilization λ⁎ that depends on the structural parameters of the 161 model. The two policymakers that are relevant for the way interest rates are set, the government and the central bank are characterized by the following one period loss functions:
where superscript G indicates the government and superscript CB indicates the central bank. The only difference between these 167 two loss functions and the loss function for society as a whole lies in the weight that is attached to stabilization of the output gap. In 168 this model, we suppose that the government, for political reasons, is more concerned about deviations in the output gap than 169 society. So, it attaches a higher weight to stabilization of the output gap than society does (λ G N λ ⁎ ), which is suboptimal for social 170 welfare. 
In the remainder of the paper the optimal levels for inflation and the output gap have been set at zero, both for the central bank 180 and the government. This implies that our results hold even if the government does not suffer from an inflationary bias.
181
Introducing a positive bias for the government would only strengthen our results. Setting the target values at zero, and minimizing the loss function subject to the Phillips curve, we get the following optimal targeting rule for monetary policy:
185
This rule is optimal in the sense that it minimizes loss function (7), so that given the preferences of both the government and the 186 central bank and also given the weight that both policymakers have in determining the monetary policy loss function (7) 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to derive an exact mapping between the optimal 196 weights in the optimal Taylor rule and the optimal targeting rule, but it can be done.
197
In the institutional design stage, society knows the degree of independence γ that is granted to the central bank as well as the preferences of the government. Its task, at this stage, is to pick a central banker with such preferences that the effective weight on stabilization of the output gap is in line with society's optimal weight. To ensure this, society should select a central banker with 200 the following preference for output stabilization: shows that the central bank needs to be more conservative, the less independent it is (so, the lower γ). So, if the government 207 interferes a lot in the formulation of monetary policy, it will encounter a more conservative central bank. If, on the other hand, the 208 central bank is completely independent (γ = 1) and determines monetary policy without any interference from the government, it 209 is optimal for society to simply pick a central banker whose preference for output stabilization is equal to the optimal value derived 210 by Woodford (2003) , so (λ CB N λ ⁎ ). The less independence the central bank has (low γ) and the more excessive weight politicians 211 attach to stabilization of the output gap (λ G N λ ⁎ ), the more conservative the central bank has to be in order to conduct optimal 212 monetary policy. 
Policy implications of the trade-off between independence and conservatism
214
In other words, delegating monetary policy to an independent and 'conservative' central bank will reduce the variability of 215 inflation and improve welfare. There is an optimal level of independence cum conservatism (γɛ⁎). Under certain assumptions, this 216 is shown graphically in Fig. 1 . Optimal means that the loss function of the society (Eq. (3)) is minimized.
217
It also follows from Eq. (9) combinations of γ and ɛ that may yield the same outcome, including the optimal one. We can illustrate this in Fig. 2 . , 1992) .
245
In the institutional design stage of the ECB, when its statutes were drawn up, the ECB was granted a very high degree of 246 independence (γ close to 1). This arrangement allowed the ECB to have the best of both worlds by having preferences close to the 247 social optimum (λ CB close λ ⁎ , see Eq. (9)) and still be a credible inflation fighter. It is also obvious from Fig. 2 that if the 248 independence granted to the ECB was going to be reduced (lower γ), it would be optimal to appoint more a conservative central become like Wim Duisenberg's "whipped cream": the more politicians stir them, the stiffer they become. We argue that it is 262 optimal for society to select central bankers that have the right degree of conservatism (given the present level of independence)
263
and have the "whipped cream" property that makes them more conservative, if and when the level of independence is reduced.
264
Both the Thomas Becket effect and the "whipped cream" characteristic are perceptible with the (newly) appointed members of the
265
Governing Council of the ECB and perhaps most remarkable with President Trichet after the discussion of Treaty reform including 
243
the change of the institutional set-up and the grouping of the ECB in the first part of the Treaty as one of the "other institutions and but may also lead to more conservatism (inflation aversion) with the ECB. Central bankers are like Duisenberg's "whipping cream"
306 faced with the reduction in their independence, they develop a more conservative attitude.
307
As we argued above both the Thomas Becket effect and the "whipped cream" characteristic are perceptible with the (newly) 
311
Politicians should realize that their attempts to downgrade ECB's independence legally and verbally will only increase its 312 conservatism in order to maintain the same monetary policy stance and limit the ECB's degrees of freedom with respect to its 313 interest rate policy. The consequences of these attempts are relative higher interest rates in the eurozone, being exactly the
314
opposite of what they wish to achieve.
315
Sometimes it is better to tie yourself, like Odysseus, to the mast to resist the siren voice. 
